Battle Of Teutoburg Mac OS

Velleius Paterculus (c. 20 BCE - after 30 CE) Roman officer, senator, and scholar, author of a brief Roman History.

In his Roman History, the Roman officer-historian Velleius Paterculus (20 BCE - after 30 CE) has included a description of the battle in the Teutoburg Forest (September 9 CE). The author was active in the Germanic wars and knew many of the actors personally. His account is the oldest surviving description of the battle and relies on eyewitness accounts; the battlefield has been discovered at Kalkriese.

Book 2, chapters 117-120, of Paterculus' Roman History are presented here in the translation by F.W. Shipley.

Battle of the Teutoburg Forest, (Autumn, 9 ce), conflict between the Roman Empire and Germanic insurgents. The Germanic leader Arminius organized a series of ambushes on a column of three Roman legions headed by Publius Quinctilius Varus. This title focuses more on multiplayer mode because that’s the trend these days. Combined Arms CO-OP mode and Fire Storm battle royale are the gameplay keys of this game. The World War I events from the Battlefield V Mac OS X‘s predecessor are continued in this title, with a few changes. The most important and criticized was the. Battle of the Teutoburg Forest (9 AD) The Battle of the Teutoburg Forest, described as the Varian Disaster (Clades Variana) by Roman historians, took place in the Teutoburg Forest in 9 CE, when an alliance of Germanic tribes ambushed and decisively destroyed three Roman legions and their auxiliaries, led by Publius Quinctilius Varus.

The Battle in the Teutoburg Forest

[2.117.1] Scarcely had Tiberius put the finishing touch upon the Pannonian and Dalmatian war,note[Fought in the years 6-9.] when, within five days of the completion of this task, dispatches from Germania brought the baleful news of the death of Varus, and of the slaughter of three legions,note[The Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and Nineteenth legions.] of as many divisions of cavalry, and of six cohorts - as though fortune were granting us this indulgence at least, that such a disaster should not be brought upon us when our commander was occupied by other wars. The cause of this defeat and the personality of the general require of me a brief digression.

[2.117.2] Varus Quintilius, descended from a famous rather than a high-born family, was a man of mild character and of a quiet disposition, somewhat slow in mind as he was in body, and more accustomed to the leisure of the camp than to actual service in war. That he was no despiser of money is demonstrated by his governorship of Syria: he entered this rich province a poor man, and left this poor province a rich man.

[2.117.3] When placed in charge of the army in Germania, he entertained the notion that the Germans were a people who were men only in limbs and voice, and that they, who could not be subdued by the sword, could be soothed by the law.

[2.117.4] With this purpose in mind he entered the heart of Germanianote[In the year 6.] as though he were going among a people enjoying the blessings of peace, and sitting on his tribunal he wasted the time of a summer campaign in holding court and observing the proper details of legal procedure.

[2.118.1] But the Germans, who with their great ferocity combine great craft, to an extent scarcely credible to one who has had no experience with them, and are a race to lying born, by trumping up a series of fictitious lawsuits, now provoking one another to disputes, and now expressing their gratitude that Roman justice was settling these disputes, that their own barbarous nature was being softened down by this new and hitherto unknown method, and that quarrels which were usually settled by arms were now being ended by law, brought Quintilius to such a complete degree of negligence, that he came to look upon himself as a city praetor administering justice in the forum, and not a general in command of an army in the heart of Germania.

[2.118.2] Thereupon appeared a young man of noble birth, brave in action and alert in mind, possessing an intelligence quite beyond the ordinary barbarian; he was, namely, Arminius, the son of Segimer, a prince of that nation, and he showed in his countenance and in his eyes the fire of the mind within. He had been associated with us constantly on private campaigns, and had even attained the dignity of equestrian rank. This young man made use of the negligence of the general as an opportunity for treachery, sagaciously seeing that no one could be more quickly overpowered than the man who feared nothing, and that the most common beginning of disaster was a sense of security.

Massacre

[2.118.3] At first, then, he admitted but a few, later a large number, to a share in his design; he told them, and convinced them too, that the Romans could be crushed, added execution to resolve, and named a day for carrying out the plot.

[2.118.4] This was disclosed to Varus through Segestes, a loyal man of that race and of illustrious name, who also demanded that the conspirators be put in chains. But fate now dominated the plans of Varus and had blindfolded the eyes of his mind. Indeed, it is usually the case that heaven perverts the judgment of the man whose fortune it means to reverse, and brings it to pass - and this is the wretched part of it - that that which happens by chance seems to be deserved, and accident passes over into culpability. And so Quintilius refused to believe the story, and insisted upon judging the apparent friendship of the Germans toward him by the standard of his merit. And, after this first warning, there was no time left for a second.

[2.119.1] The details of this terrible calamity, the heaviest that had befallen the Romans on foreign soil since the disaster of Crassus in Parthia,note[A reference to the battle at Carrhae, where the Romans were defeated by the Parthian commander Surena, in 53 BCE.] I shall endeavor to set forth, as others have done, in my larger work. Here I can merely lament the disaster as a whole.

[2.119.2] An army unexcelled in bravery, the first of Roman armies in discipline, in energy, and in experience in the field, through the negligence of its general, the perfidy of the enemy, and the unkindness of fortune was surrounded, nor was as much opportunity as they had wished given to the soldiers either of fighting or of extricating themselves, except against heavy odds; nay, some were even heavily chastised for using the arms and showing the spirit of Romans. Hemmed in by forests and marshes and ambuscades, it was exterminated almost to a man by the very enemy whom it had always slaughtered like cattle, whose life or death had depended solely upon the wrath or the pity of the Romans.

[2.119.3] The general had more courage to die than to fight, for, following the example of his father and grandfather, he ran himself through with his sword.

[2.119.4] Of the two prefects of the camp, Lucius Eggius furnished a precedent as noble as that of Ceionius was base, who, after the greater part of the army had perished, proposed its surrender, preferring to die by torture at the hands of the enemy than in battle. Vala Numonius, lieutenant of Varus, who, in the rest of his life, had been an inoffensive and an honorable man, also set a fearful example in that he left the infantry unprotected by the cavalry and in flight tried to reach the Rhine with his squadrons of horse. But fortune avenged his act, for he did not survive those whom he had abandoned, but died in the act of deserting them.

[2.119.5] The body of Varus, partially burned, was mangled by the enemy in their barbarity; his head was cut off and taken to Maroboduusnote[King of the Marcomanni, living in Bohemia.] and was sent by him to Caesar; but in spite of the disaster it was honored by burial in the tomb of his family.note[I.e., the tomb of the imperial family, the Mausoleum of Augustus.]

[2.120.1] On hearing of this disaster, Tiberius flew to his father's side. The constant protector of the Roman empire again took up his accustomed part. Dispatched to Germania, he reassured the provinces of Gaul, distributed his armies, strengthened the garrison towns, and then, measuring himself by the standard of his own greatness, and not by the presumption of an enemy who threatened Italy with a war like that of the Cimbri and Teutones,note[Germanic tribes that had invaded the Mediterranean world in the last decade of the second century BCE.] he took the offensive and crossed the Rhine with his army.

[2.120.2] He thus made aggressive war upon the enemy when his father and his country would have been content to let him hold them in check, he penetrated into the heart of the country, opened up military roads, devastated fields, burned houses, routed those who came against him, and, without loss to the troops with which he had crossed, he returned, covered with glory, to winter quarters.

[2.120.3] Due tribute should be paid to Lucius Asprenas, who was serving as lieutenant under Varus his uncle, and who, backed by the brave and energetic support of the two legions under his command,note[Lucius Nonius Asprenas, a relative of Varus, was the commander of the army of Germania Superior. His legions, I Germanica and V Alaudae, were stationed at Mainz.] saved his army from this great disaster, and by a quick descent to the quarters of the army in Germania Inferior strengthened the allegiance of the races even on the hither side of the Rhine who were beginning to waver. There are those, however, who believed that, though he had saved the lives of the living, he had appropriated to his own use the property of the dead who were slain with Varus, and that inheritances of the slaughtered army were claimed by him at pleasure.

[2.120.4] The valor of Lucius Caedicius, prefect of the camp, also deserves praise, and of those who, pent up with him at Aliso, were besieged by an immense force of Germans. For, overcoming all their difficulties which want rendered unendurable and the forces of the enemy almost insurmountable, following a design that was carefully considered, and using a vigilance that was ever on the alert, they watched their chance, and with the sword won their way back to their friends.

[2.120.5] From all this it is evident that Varus, who was, it must be confessed, a man of character and of good intentions, lost his life and his magnificent army more through lack of judgment in the commander than of valor in his soldiers.

[2.120.6] When the Germans were venting their rage upon their captives, an heroic act was performed by Caldus Caelius, a young man worthy in every way of his long line of ancestors, who, seizing a section of the chain with which he was bound, brought down with such force upon his own head as to cause his instant death, both his brains and his blood gushing from the wound.

From Simple English Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Battle of the Teutoburg Forest
Part of the Roman-Germanic wars

Cenotaph of Marcus Caelius, 1st centurion of XVIII, who 'fell in the war of Varus' (bello Variano)
Reconstructed inscription: 'To Marcus Caelius, son of Titus, of the Lemonian district, from Bologna, first centurion of the eighteenth legion. 53½ years old. He fell in the Varian War. His bones may be interred here. Publius Caelius, son of Titus, of the Lemonian district, his brother, erected (this monument)'.[1]
DateSeptember, 9 AD (no exact date)
Location
ResultGermanic victory
Roman Empire's withdrawal from Germany
Belligerents
Germanic tribes (Cherusci, Marsi, Chatti, Bructeri, Chauci and Sicambri).Roman Empire
Commanders and leaders
ArminiusPublius Quinctilius Varus
Strength
12,000 – 32,00020,000 – max. 36,000:
3 Roman legions (XVII, XVIII/XIIX, and XIX/XVIIII),
3 alae and
6 auxiliary cohorts
Casualties and losses
unknown16,000 dead [2][3]
some enslaved
The Teutoburg Forest

The Battle of the Teutoburg Forest was a military battle that took place in the year 9 AD. In the battle, an alliance of Germanic tribes won a major victory over three Roman legions. The Germanic tribes were led by Arminius; the Roman legions by Publius Quinctilius Varus.

This was more than a victory, it was the complete destruction of three Roman legions and all their commanders; the few men who survived were made slaves.[4] It was one of the two greatest disasters in Roman military history (the other being at the Battle of Cannae). Apart from occasional raids and campaigns, the Romans never again held the Germanic land across the Rhine.

The battle began a seven-year war which ended with the Rhine as the boundary of the Roman Empire for the next four hundred years, until the decline of the Western Roman Empire.

The leaders[changechange source]

The Roman commander, Varus, was about the fourth most important man in Rome.[5] He was known and feared because of his ruthless actions and his crucifixion of defeated enemies. It is certain this was known to the Germans, and may have helped the tribes come together to resist him.

The German commander was Arminius, who had been given a Roman military education. He had spent his youth in Rome as a hostage. Therefore, he knew Roman military methods: this knowledge was to be crucial.

Later, Arminius returned to Germania with Varus, and became his trusted advisor.[4] In secret, he forged an alliance of Germanic tribes that had traditionally been enemies.[6] He was helped to do this by the anger over Varus' insolence and cruelty to the people he defeated.[7][8]

'...Stratagem was, therefore, indispensable; and it was necessary to blind Varus to their schemes until a favorable opportunity should arrive for striking a decisive blow...' British historian Edward Shepherd Creasy (1812–1878)

While Varus was on his way from his summer camp, west of the Weser river, to the winter headquarters near the Rhine, he heard reports of a local rebellion. This was faked by Arminius.[9]

'...This was represented to Varus as an occasion which required his prompt attendance at the spot; but he was kept in studied ignorance of its being part of a concerted national rising; and he still looked on Arminius as his submissive vassal...' Edward Shepherd Creasy

Battle Of Teutoburg Forest Artifacts

Teutoburg

Recent archaeological finds place the battle at Kalkriese Hill in Osnabrück County, Lower Saxony.[6] The Romans must at this time have been marching northwestward from the area that is now the city of Detmold, passing east of Osnabrück; they must then have camped in this area before being attacked.

Battle[changechange source]

Varus's forces included three legions, six cohorts of auxiliary troops (non-citizens or allied troops) and three squadrons of cavalry. Many of them had little combat experience with Germanic fighters under local conditions.

The Roman forces were not marching in combat formation, and there were also large numbers of camp-followers. As they entered the forest they found the track narrow and muddy; according to Dio Cassius a violent storm had also arisen. He also writes that Varus neglected to send out advance reconnaissance parties.

The line of march was dangerously stretched out – estimates are that it was more than 15 km (9 miles), and was perhaps as long as 20 km (12 miles).[4] It was then suddenly attacked by Germanic warriors who were carrying some light swords, large lances and spears that came with short and narrow blades, so sharp and warrior friendly that they could be used as required. The Germanic warriors surrounded the entire Roman army and rained down javelins on the intruders.[10]

The Romans were able to set up a fortified night camp, and the next morning broke out into open country, near the modern town of Ostercappeln. The break-out cost them heavy losses, as did a further attempt to escape by marching through another forest area, with heavy rains continuing. The rain stopped them from using their bows because sinew strings become slack when wet, and left them virtually defenseless as their shields also became waterlogged.

The Romans then began a night march to escape, but marched into another trap that Arminius had set, at the foot of a hill near Osnabrück. There, the sandy, open strip on which the Romans could march easily narrowed at the bottom of the hill. There was a gap of only about 100 m between the woods and the swampland at the edge of the Great Bog. The road was blocked by a trench, and, towards the forest, an earthen wall had been built along the roadside. This let the tribesmen to attack the Romans from cover.

The Romans made a desperate attempt to storm the wall, but failed. The Germanic warriors then stormed the field and slaughtered the Romans; Varus committed suicide.[4]

Around 15,000–20,000 Roman soldiers must have died; not only Varus, but also many of his officers are said to have taken their own lives by falling on their swords in the approved manner.[4]Tacitus wrote that many officers were sacrificed by the Germans as part of their indigenous religious ceremonies, cooked in pots and their bones used for rituals.[11] However, others were ransomed, and some of the common soldiers were enslaved.

The victory over the legions was followed by a clean sweep of all Roman forts, garrisons and cities – of which there were at least two – east of the Rhine. The remaining two Roman legions in Germany were stationed in a fort at Mainz, and commanded by Varus' nephew. They were content to try to hold the Rhine.

See Full List On Military.wikia.org

Varus's mistakes[changechange source]

  1. Segestes, father of Arminius' wife and opposed to the marriage, warned Varus about Arminius. The night before the Roman forces left, he suggested Varus arrest Arminius and several other Germanic leaders. He must have known they were plotting an uprising. Varus dismissed the advice as motivated by a personal feud.
    Arminius then left saying he would drum up Germanic forces to support the Roman campaign. Instead he led his troops, who must have been waiting close by, in attacks on surrounding Roman garrisons.
  2. Even without this warning, Varus, as a matter of policy, should have been less trusting of Arminius, who turned out to be a double agent.
  3. The choice of a march through the forest was against normal Roman military methods, because both vision and defence are limited in a forest. The march was not done in combat formation.
    Obviously, this route was chosen as a 'short cut', but Varus had no proof that such urgency was really necessary. This was doubly so as the forest caused the line to stretch so far that one part could not support another.
  4. The lack of scouts ('reconnaissance parties') was almost criminal, and would probably have had Varus executed had he not taken his life.
  5. The bad weather was another good reason for caution when going into the forest. The forest was unknown ground to Varus. New routes should always be scouted.

Though we can never know why Varus made these mistakes, his reputation for arrogance and over-confidence suggests he underestimated the Germans. But all Rome's previous experience, from Caesar onwards, had shown the Germanic tribes as strong in war.

Aftermath[changechange source]

Upon hearing of the defeat, the Emperor Augustus, according to the Roman historian Suetonius in his work De vita Caesarum (On the life of the Caesars), was so shaken by the news that he stood butting his head against the wall of his palace, repeatedly shouting:

Quintili Vare, legiones redde!“ ('Quintilius Varus, give me back my legions!')

The three legion numbers were never used again by the Romans after this defeat, unlike other legions that were restructured – a case unique in Roman history.

The battle ended the period of triumphant Roman expansion that had followed the end of the Civil Wars 40 years earlier. Augustus' stepson Tiberius took effective control, and prepared for the continuation of the war. Three legions were sent to the Rhine to replace the lost legions.

Roman retaliation[changechange source]

The Roman commander Germanicus was the opponent of Arminius in 14–16 AD

Though their shock at the slaughter was great, the Romans began a slow, systematic preparation to reconquer the country. In 14 AD, just after Augustus' death, and the accession of his heir and stepson Tiberius, a huge raid was led by the new emperor's nephew Germanicus.

On a starry night he massacred the Marsi and ravaged their villages with fire and sword. That night the Germans had celebrated; drunk and asleep, they were surprised by Germanicus. The temple of their deity was destroyed.

Several other tribes were roused by this slaughter and ambushed Germanicus on the way to his winter-quarters, but were defeated with heavy losses.[12][13]

The next year was marked by two major campaigns and several smaller battles with a large army estimated at 55,000–70,000 men, backed by naval forces. In spring 15 AD, the legate Caecina Severus invaded the Marsi a second time with 25,000–30,000 men, causing great havoc.

Meanwhile, Germanicus' troops had built a fort on Mount Taunus from where he marched with 30 to 35,000 men against the Chatti (probably a region of villages) and slaughtered children, women and the elderly. The able-bodied men fled across a river and hid themselves in the forests. After this blow Germanicus marched on Mattium and burned the city down.[14][15]

In summer 15 AD, the army visited the site of the first battle. According to Tacitus, they found heaps of bones, and skulls nailed to trees, which they buried, '...looking on all as kinsfolk and of their own blood...'. Burial pits with remains fitting this description have been found at Kalkriese Hill.

Under Germanicus, the Romans marched another army, with allied Germanic soldiers, into Germania in 16 AD. He was able to fight his way across the Weser near modern Minden, suffering some losses. He forced Arminius' army to stand in open battle at the Weser River. Germanicus's legions inflicted huge casualties on the Germanic armies while sustaining only minor losses.

One final battle was fought at the Angivarian Wall, west of modern Hanover. Again many Germanic soldiers were killed, which forced them to flee. In summer 16 AD, Caius Silius marched against the Chatti with 33,000 men. Germanicus invaded the Marsi for a third time and devastated their land.[16]

With his main goals reached and winter coming, Germanicus ordered his army back to their winter camps, with the fleet getting damaged in a storm in the North Sea. After a few more raids across the Rhine, with the recovery of two of the three Roman legions' eagles lost in 9 AD, Tiberius ordered the Roman forces to halt and withdraw across the Rhine. Germanicus was recalled to Rome and informed by Tiberius that he would be given a Triumph and a new command.[17][18][19]

Germanicus' campaign had been to revenge the defeat at Teutoburg, and also partly in reaction to signs of mutiny amongst his troops.

Arminius, who had been considered a real threat to stability by Rome, was now defeated. Once his allied Germanic coalition had been broken and honour avenged, the huge cost and risk of keeping the Roman army operating beyond the Rhine was not worth any likely benefit to be gained.[4]

The last chapter of this story is told by the historian Tacitus. Around 50 AD, bands of Chatti invaded Roman territory and began to plunder (take everything of value). The Roman commander, with a legionary force supported by Roman cavalry and auxiliaries, attacked the Chatti from both sides and defeated them. The Romans were ecstatic when they found Roman prisoners, including some from Varus' legions who had been held by the Chatti for 40 years.[20]

Later German nationalism[changechange source]

The battle,[21] and the histories of Tacitus, had a big effect on 19th century German nationalism. In the 19th century the Germans were still divided into many German states, but they linked themselves with the Germanic tribes as shared ancestors of one 'German people'.

In 1808, the German author Heinrich von Kleist's play Die Hermannsschlacht aroused anti-Napoleonic sentiment, even though it could not be performed under French occupation.

Later, the figure of Arminius was used to represent the ideals of freedom and unification – as supported by German liberals, and opposed by reactionary rulers. A memorial – the Hermannsdenkmal – was begun during this period, and Arminius became a symbol of Pan-Germanism. The monument remained unfinished for decades, until after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71 unified the country. The completed monument was then a symbol of conservative German nationalism.

References[changechange source]

  1. 'Marcus Caelius'. www.livius.org. 2010.
  2. Wells, Peter S. The Battle that stopped Rome. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. 2003, p. 187 ISBN0-393-32643-8
  3. Kevin Sweeney, Scholars look at factors surrounding Hermann’s victory. www.nujournal.com
  4. 4.04.14.24.34.44.5Fergus M. Bordewich 2005. 'The ambush that changed history' in Smithsonian Magazine, September 2005, pp. 74–81.
  5. after Augustus, Tiberius and Germanicus.
  6. 6.06.1'Publius Quinctilius Varus (46 BC--9 AD)'. www.livius.org. 2010.
  7. 'Ancient Library: Drusus'. Archived from the original on 2012-10-12. Retrieved 2010-11-19.
  8. 'Germans under Arminius revolt against Rome'. Edward Shepherd Creasy, The Great Events by Famous Historians, Vol. 2. 1905.
  9. Livius: Legio XVII
  10. Spilsbury Julian (2010). Great Military Disasters. UK: Quercus. ISBN9781848660397.
  11. Tacitus, Annals, I.61
  12. Tacitus, Annals, I.50
  13. Tacitus, Annals, I.51
  14. Matthew Bunson: A dictionary of the Roman Empire. Oxford University Press US 1995, ISBN0195102339, p83
  15. Tacitus, Annals, I.56
  16. Tacitus, Annals, II.25
  17. Tacitus, Annals, II.26
  18. An image of a coin of Germanicus with a recovered standard can be seen at http://www.livius.org/le-lh/legio/xvii.html
  19. Tacitus: [1] Annals: Book 2 {Chapter 32}
  20. Tacitus, Annals, XII.27
  21. which is called Schlacht im Teutoburger Wald, Varusschlacht or Hermannsschlacht in German
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